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Introduction
In 1977, Congress passed the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act (CRA) to encourage
federally insured depository institutions
to lend in low- to moderate-income neigh-
borhoods and to low- to moderate-income
people. Since then, the profitability of the
many special lending programs designed
to achieve these goals has been questioned
on both theoretical and practical grounds.
1
Arguments range from “if the business
was profitable you wouldn’t have to pres-
sure institutions to do it" to “we found
new markets and new profits through
CRA lending.” While CRA requires banks
and thrifts to “help meet the credit needs
of communities in which they are char-
tered,” it further cautions that these efforts
should be “consistent with safe and
sound operations of such institutions.”
Despite the “safe and sound” caution,
questions about the risk and overall prof-
itability of CRA lending persist. Many per-
ceive CRA lending to be risky business,
with higher losses and lower profits. Anec-
dotal evidence, on the other hand, sug-
gests that losses on CRA loans may not
be appreciably different than for non-CRA
loans, and some institutions report their
CRA lending is profitable.
Being profitable by simply avoiding losses,
however, is not enough. The returns on
CRA loans must be as great as those 
received on other products if lenders are to
have a business incentive to extend these
loans. Without such returns, institutions
will be reluctant to make CRA loans and
will be at a competitive disadvantage with
lending institutions not subject to CRA.
In this study, our goals were to determine
if some lenders have been able to under-
take CRA lending in a way that is competi-
tively profitable with their conventional
lending and, if so, describe how they did
it. We focused on home mortgage lending,
which is a relatively standardized, high-
volume business, where lenders are likely
to have become proficient. What we learned
about home mortgage lending likely has
implications for other types of CRA lend-
ing and the longer-run profitability of
CRA lending in general. Our findings
also have implications for other frequent
parties to CRA lending including govern-
ment, community organizations and
regulators. 
To conduct the study, we surveyed large
home mortgage lenders. We asked about
credit risk, loan terms, processing costs,
and overall profitability of single-family
13
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mortgage lending.residential CRA loans and comparable
conventional loans. This information
permitted a comparison of strategies
among institutions that found single-
family residential CRA lending competi-
tively profitable with conventional
lending and those that did not.
Background
Several pieces of legislation have helped
shape lending to low- and moderate-
income individuals and neighborhoods.
CRA set out to eliminate the practice of
“redlining” and encourage insured deposi-
tory institutions to reinvest in their com-
munities. The Financial Institutions,
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA) provided for greater
public disclosure of lending to low- and
moderate-income borrowers,
2 hastening
the development of affordable housing
lending programs, 
3 and increasing
credit available to low-income borrow-
ers.
4 Finally, the Federal Housing Enter-
prise Financial Safety and Soundness
Act of 1992 added further support for
CRA lending by requiring the Department
of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) to set purchasing goals for mort-
gage loans to low- and moderate-income
families by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association (Fannie Mae) and Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), thereby strengthening
the secondary markets for these loans.
These advances in CRA lending, how-
ever, have not been without controversy.
In the early 1990s, a U.S. Senate task
force ranked CRA tenth on a “Ten Worst
Regulations List.”
5 Surveys of bankers
have often indicated that CRA is one of
the most costly regulations to comply
with. Some have argued that CRA has
forced banks to make loans they would
not otherwise make, subjecting them to
increased credit risk and lower profitability.
Data on loan losses and profitability of
CRA loans, although spotty and largely
anecdotal, generally do not show these
loans to be riskier or less profitable than
conventional loans. However, some stud-
ies have shown that delinquency rates,
but not default rates, tend to be higher
on CRA loans.
6 Various surveys on over-
all profitability indicate some lenders sac-
rifice profitability to subsidize their CRA
loans, while other lenders make money,
expect to make money, or break even on
their CRA loans.
7 
Information on mortgage lending gath-
ered from round table discussions
across the country with bankers, com-
munity groups, and others are consis-
tent with these findings.
8 For example:
Reviewing the components of profitability
—transactions costs, delinquencies and
defaults, and revenues— participants
generally agreed that, for low-income
neighborhoods, the costs are higher, delin-
quencies (but not necessarily defaults)
are more common, and revenues are
similar to those experienced in other
neighborhoods. There are no signs that
the profitability of lending in low-income
neighborhoods is high.9
On subsidized mortgage lending programs
where the borrower and lender rely on
some form of private or public assistance
or guarantees, round table participants
noted that low-income, subsidized mort-
gage markets “yield little return to pri-
vate equity, and they would be smaller
in scope if not for subsidies and a need
to meet CRA requirements.”
10
Factors hindering profitability were
higher paperwork costs, the need for
staff with specialized knowledge about
subsidy programs, and screening and
monitoring costs required by some pro-
grams. Also important in the profitability
equation were limitations in subsidy pro-
grams that discouraged or prevented
lenders from pricing for risk.
An interesting observation from round table
participants was that smaller community
banks may have transactions cost and
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14risk management advantages over larger
institutions in extending CRA loans. These
potential advantages resulted from
smaller lenders knowing their commu-
nity residents better and developing
stronger borrower relationships over time.
This close tie between borrower and
lender allowed more personal monitoring
of loans, something that was apparently
difficult to replicate on a larger scale.
Large lenders, on the other hand, tended
to rely on standardized risk measures
and processes to handle their higher
loan volume and to keep costs down.
Since CRA loans often don’t fit a stand-
ard mold, the need to handle these loans
individually may result in higher proces-
sing costs. Less direct contact with bor-
rowers may also result in greater credit
risks at larger institutions.
The model
To evaluate the profitability of single-
family residential CRA lending, we asked
lenders questions structured around a
standard accounting model for analyzing
the profitability of a loan product:








Questions focused on the overall profit-
ability of CRA lending (net income) as
well as its component factors, thus pro-
viding an opportunity to explore how
some lenders achieved more profitable
CRA lending. 
The survey
The survey was designed to accommodate
a lack of cost accounting information on
CRA lending at institutions. In particular,
we asked respondents for their judgments
on the profitability of CRA lending relative
to conventional lending at their institutions.
The survey focused on single-family resi-
dential lending. The high volume and
relatively standardized terms and under-
writing criteria for this lending contributed
both to lender expertise in making these
loans and to enough consistent data being
generated for meaningful observations.
We knew many institutions would have
more than one CRA home mortgage lend-
ing program. Where this was the case,
we asked respondents to provide informa-
tion about their organization’s most impor-
tant program or the program that most
typified their experience with CRA lending.
Our survey asked respondents for gen-
eral information about their organizations,
their economic environment, and their
CRA lending profitability.
11 Information
about the organizations and their envi-
ronment centered on the local economy,
areas served, institution type, annual vol-
ume of CRA and conventional loan origi-
nations, and ways CRA lending was
approached. The questions pertaining to
CRA lending profitability focused on
credit risk, transactions costs, loan fees
and terms, and profitability. We also
asked for comments about other matters
that might affect these factors. 
The respondents
The intent of the study was to evaluate
the relative profitability of seasoned CRA
programs, describe possible reasons for
profitability differences, and offer insights
for improving profitability. Since informa-
tion on the maturity of CRA programs was
not readily available, we surveyed institu-
tions that had total assets of $100 mil-
lion or more, assuming their size would
correlate with CRA lending experience.
To lessen the effects of location, we only
surveyed institutions located in metro-
politan areas. Further, we only sent
questionnaires to institutions that had
institutions, most
studies on CRA lend-
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155 percent or more of their loans in single-
family residential loans. This was to ensure
they did enough of this type of lending to
have expertise in making single-family
residential loans. 
After screening for size, location, and
mortgage volume, we sent surveys to 600
institutions across the nation, including
217 banks, 165 savings and loan institu-
tions, and 218 bank holding companies
with mortgage banking subsidiaries. No
organization was represented in the sur-
vey more than once. For example, if a
bank and a mortgage banking company
of a bank holding company were both in
our survey sample, the bank holding
company was sent one survey and we
left it to the company to forward it to the
most appropriate respondent.
Ninety-seven organizations (16 percent)
responded to the survey, including 52
banks, 21 savings and loans, 9 mortgage
banking subsidiaries of bank holding
companies, and 15 bank holding compa-
nies, savings and loan holding compa-
nies, or savings banks. These institutions
operated in 38 states. Ninety-two per-
cent of them reported average to strong
economic and housing conditions in
their markets. 
All but one respondent made CRA loans
directly. Many respondents had rela-
tively new CRA home mortgage pro-
grams, with approximately 50 percent
being started after 1989.
12
It is important to note that some of our
survey questions addressed areas that
respondents did not track separately,
and some respondents did not answer
all questions. Because of this, the discus-
sion and analysis of survey results include
information on the number of responses
to questions as well as percentage infor-
mation. Where the number of responses
is small, the data should be interpreted
with caution.
Survey results
In the following sections we explore dif-
ferent aspects of CRA lending profitabil-
ity to determine what strategies and
practices made it more profitable at
some institutions than others. We start
by reviewing overall profitability of CRA
and conventional lending then explore 
individual revenue and expense factors
affecting that profitability. Care should
be exercised, however, in generalizing
our profitability findings to all institu-
tions making CRA loans since our data
sample was not randomly drawn. Never-
theless, our results corroborate many
findings of other studies and, conse-
quently, may represent CRA profit experi-
ences beyond those who responded to
the survey. 
Profitability
Ninety-eight percent of survey respon-
dents said their CRA lending was “profit-
able” (see Figure 1).
13 Within this 98
percent, there were substantial differ-
ences in degrees of profitability. Twenty-
four percent said their CRA lending was
as profitable or more profitable than
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16concluded it was “less profitable” or
“substantially less profitable” than their
conventional lending. 
As noted earlier, many CRA lending pro-
grams were put in place after 1989 and,
as a consequence, their current profit-
ability may not reflect their long-term
profitability. Looking to the future, 
approximately 31 percent of the respon-
dents (29 respondents) to a question on
future profitability saw their CRA lend-
ing being at least as profitable as their
other lending. The remaining 69 percent
did not believe their CRA lending would
ever be as profitable as their conven-
tional lending. This suggests that lend-
ers in our data set may be well along the
CRA lending learning curve, since few
perceived that future profitability would
change significantly from current levels.
Besides dollar profitability, institutions
may receive other, less tangible benefits
that make CRA lending attractive. Approxi-
mately 90 percent of survey respondents
said there were non-monetary benefits to
CRA lending.
14 These included:
“Community image improves.” 
“Helps the community grow and
prosper.”
“A stronger community equals future
profitability.”
“Future customers for other products.” 
“[It] pacifies regulators and commu-
nity groups.”
Comments such as these reflect differ-
ences in both attitude and approaches
toward CRA lending, both of which may
have implications for profitability at indi-
vidual institutions.
Since our principal concern was with the
longer run profitability of CRA lending
and how some institutions achieve it, we
separated survey responses into two
lender categories: lenders who reported
their CRA lending was at least as profit-
able as their conventional lending, and
those who reported it was not. We then
examined income, expenses, and other
related information to identify factors
that may account for CRA lending profit-
ability differences between the groups.
Before discussing the comparative results,
several observations about the data and
the study methodology are in order. First,
despite attempts to identify institutions
with seasoned CRA lending programs,
most reported results were from programs
of recent vintage. Thus, the results reflect
a period during which the U.S. economy
performed well, and may not reflect prof-
itability over future business cycles.
Additionally, there may be limitations in
extrapolating the results into future
years because of changes in CRA enforce-
ment which began in 1996. The survey
covers lending under the earlier period’s
“process oriented” approach to CRA en-
forcement. Under the new “results ori-
ented” approach
15 to CRA enforcement,
some lenders may be more aggressive in
their CRA lending, absorbing more bor-
rower fees and offering lower loan inter-
est rates to establish larger CRA loan
portfolios. Such behavior would clearly
have implications for future CRA loan
profitability.
Finally, the analysis we present makes
simple bi-variate comparisons between
the profitability of an institution’s CRA
lending and its conventional lending.
However, many factors may influence
profitability simultaneously, making it
difficult to draw conclusions from our
comparisons. To deal with these influ-
ences, we used the multi-variate statisti-
cal models presented in Appendix A to
hold constant institutions’ loan origina-
tion volume (a proxy for institution size),
economic conditions, CRA program age
and FHA/VA participation. This analysis
provides support for the more simply
drawn observations from the bi-variate
comparisons.
14 Ninety institutions
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17Past performance of CRA lending 
programs: Revenue and expense 
comparisons
Loan fees, down payments, interest
rates, debt ratios, and credit histories
are important constraints on home own-
ership for all borrowers, but especially
for low-income borrowers. The CRA
programs offered by survey respondents
loosen many of these constraints (See
Appendix B). This loosening can have
revenue and expense consequences
and, hence, profitability implications for
lenders. In the following sections, we
examine these factors to evaluate their
effect on overall profitability. 
Revenue comparisons: Loan fees and 
interest rates
Many of the survey respondents’ CRA
loan programs subsidize borrowers by
absorbing some to nearly all of the fees
(appraisal, title search, credit check, fil-
ing fees, and other administrative costs)
associated with making a residential
loan. This makes home ownership more
affordable for low- to moderate-income
borrowers but lowers lender revenues
and decreases the relative profitability of
CRA programs. Survey responses show
this may be one reason why some find
CRA lending less profitable than others.
Respondents whose
CRA lending was as
profitable as their con-
ventional lending gave
up a smaller portion of
their fees (23 percent
on average) than insti-




is another factor that
can affect the relative
profitability of CRA
lending programs. Ta-
ble 1 shows that those
with CRA lending pro-
grams as profitable as their conventional
lending programs were less likely (5 per-
cent versus 39 percent) to lower rates for
borrowers than those with less profitable
programs.
Lower fees and reduced interest rates,
however, do not have to lessen profitabil-
ity. Various government programs, in-
cluding grants and other assistance,
may allow institutions to give up fees
and charge lower interest rates without
sacrificing profitability. Indeed, 22 per-
cent of those responding to the survey 
indicated that various government pro-
grams allowed them to offer lower fees
on CRA loans. Further, 29 percent said
government programs allowed them to 
offer lower interest rates on their CRA
loans. However, even with government
assistance, many respondents suggested
there is significant lender subsidization
of CRA loans:
“Bank absorbs all nonvendor fees —
i.e., appraisal, underwriting, loan ser-
vice, escrow.”
“We absorbed some of the costs and
providers of services lowered some
costs.”
“Too many lenders are subsidizing
the CRA loans, eliminating the profit.”
Interest rates and profitability
Annual percentage rate
charged on CRA loans
relative to similar size
traditional loans








Same 86   52   
Lower 5   39   
Table 1     
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18Expense comparisons: transactions costs
Transactions costs are an important fac-
tor in mortgage lending that may affect
the relative profitability of CRA lending.
To help analyze transactions costs, we
asked how CRA lending was conducted
within institutions, as well as about origi-
nation and servicing costs.
A majority of respondents (62 percent)
conducted their CRA operations through
loan officers who did other types of
lending as well. The remaining 38 per-
cent (35 respondents) indicated they
used a separate department, loan officers
specializing in CRA lending, or some
other mechanism for processing their
CRA loans.
16 
We found that 83 percent of the institu-
tions that treated CRA lending as a sepa-
rate activity (30 respondents) were in the
less profitable group. This result was
somewhat unexpected. Since CRA lend-
ing often requires specialized expertise,
we expected that institutions with sepa-
rately structured CRA programs might
benefit from the specialization. Indeed,
they may have and our results may sim-
ply reflect better accounting for CRA
loan profitability at institutions that
treat it separately.
17 
However, there may be more than account-
ing differences at work. For example, we
found that institutions with separate
CRA lending programs were more likely
to offer special incentives to loan offi-
cers for making single-family residential
CRA loans (44 percent of respondents)
than those that did not (18 percent).
These incentives can raise the cost of
originating CRA loans, thus reducing
their profitability.
Our results may also reflect institutional
size differences. We noted earlier that
larger institutions, with their stand-
ardized systems, may find it more costly
than smaller institutions to make CRA
loans. Although we did not collect size
information in our survey in order to 
preserve  respondent anonymity, the resi-
dential loan origination information we
did collect can be used as a proxy for
size and suggests that size may be a
factor in CRA loan profitability.
18 For 
example, average total single-family loan
originations for institutions with com-
paratively profitable CRA programs was
$26 million during 1994, the year cov-
ered in our survey. Average total resi-
dential originations for institutions with
less profitable CRA programs was $361
million.
19
Our results may also reflect differences
in aggressiveness among institutions in
making CRA loans. Institutions with a
separate CRA lending function may be
reaching further into the pool of poten-
tial borrowers, working with borrowers
who have fewer financial resources and
poorer credit records. Consequently, cost
advantages gained through specializa-
tion may be offset by the added expense
associated with working with more mar-
ginal borrowers who have more financial
problems to overcome.
To supplement this broader view of CRA
lending costs, we asked for specific infor-
mation on origination and servicing
costs.
20 We found that institutions with
less profitable CRA programs tended to
have higher origination costs than those
with comparatively profitable programs
(see Figure 2). Almost 70 percent of institu-
tions with less profitable programs said
origination costs on their CRA loans
were higher than those on their con-
ventional loans. In contrast, approxi-
mately 82 percent of the institutions
with CRA lending programs that are as
profitable as their conventional lend-
ing indicated that origination costs on
their CRA and traditional loans were
the same.
Table 2 lists reasons for higher origination
costs given by institutions with less prof-
itable CRA programs.
21 “Time spent with
borrower” was the most frequently cited
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19reason. “Developing borrower information”
and “Paperwork” costs were also consid-
ered to be important cost factors, as
were “Grants or payments made to com-
munity groups.”
In addition to origination costs, we asked
institutions about their loan servicing
costs. Once again, institutions with com-
paratively profitable CRA programs
showed little difference in servicing costs
between their CRA loans and their con-
ventional loans. Figure 3 shows that 95
percent of institutions with compara-
tively profitable CRA lending programs
said their servicing costs were the same
as on their conventional loans. On the
other hand, 48 percent of the institu-
tions with less profitable CRA programs
tended to incur higher servicing costs on
their CRA loans. 
Of the 32 respondents who said their
servicing costs were higher, 91 percent
attributed that to higher monitoring
costs. A few respondents offered com-
ments about these monitoring costs:
“[Greater] contact with customers and
work to keep [them] current on pay-
ments.”
“More frequent changes to insurance.
Also more past dues. More phone
calls.”
Loan losses and credit risk management
Another expense area where CRA lend-
ing may affect lender profitability is
through higher loan losses. Many stud-
ies of mortgage default rates show that
when home mortgage loan underwriting
criteria are relaxed, default rates rise.
22
CRA lending programs often relax key
underwriting parameters identified as
predictors of loan default—such as loan
to value, debt to income ratios, junior
financing, maturity, interest rate (see
Appendix B). Therefore, we asked about
underwriting standards, risk control
methods, and manageability of credit
risk for CRA residential loans.
Our questions on underwriting stand-
ards (see Appendix C) focused primarily
on the three “Cs” of credit: character, 
capacity, and collateral. Institutions with
comparatively profitable CRA programs
indicated they relaxed their credit stand-
ards, but often not to the same degree as
those with less profitable programs. For
example, the more profitable CRA lend-
ers placed more emphasis on repayment
capacity—being less likely to accept higher
debt to income ratios—and on collateral
in making CRA loans. 
Many of the differences in credit stand-
ards between the two groups appear to
be small. Studies show, however, that
loan performance deteriorates signifi-
cantly when multiple standards are 
relaxed.
23 As a consequence, small differ-
ences in individual factors may translate
into substantial differences in credit risk
when many factors are relaxed. We
noted that banks with more profitable
CRA programs tended to relax fewer of
their loan underwriting criteria than
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itable programs.
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Time spent with borrower 90 44
Developing borrower information 65 32
Paperwork 49 24
Grant or payments made
to community groups 33 16
Incentives paid to loan officers 14 7
Other factors 24 12
* Percentage is based on 49 respondents indicating their servicing costs were higher.
Table 2
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21those with less profitable programs. The 22
institutions with more profitable CRA pro-
grams relaxed, on an average, 1.3 of five
broadly defined credit and underwriting
standards (debt to income, loan to value,
collateral, character and credit history).
Those with less profitable programs relaxed
an average of 2.1 of these standards.
Institutions may be comfortable relaxing
some of their credit standards if they
know there are other mechanisms for
managing credit risk. Consequently, we
asked respondents about their reliance on
government guarantees, community
groups, and lending consortia to
lessen their credit risk exposure (see
Table 3). While both groups made
extensive use of these enhance-
ments, especially community
groups and government guaran-
tees, those with the comparatively
profitable programs were less likely
to use these alternative risk reduc-
ing enhancements than institu-
tions with less profitable programs.
One possible explanation for this
is that extension of an institution’s
existing underwriting standards
to include CRA loans may be opera-
tionally less costly than using 
external risk reducing techniques.
To judge how important these
risk  reducing enhancements
were in the lending process, we
asked respondents what propor-
tion of their loans would not have
been made without them. Their
responses are presented in Table 4.
As would be expected, institutions
with less profitable CRA programs
were less likely to make CRA
loans without them. However, a
high proportion of CRA loans—75
percent or more—would have
been made by either profitability
group even without enhancements.
In addition to addressing under-
writing criteria, the survey asked
respondents to compare the 
delinquency  and loan loss rates on their
CRA loans relative to their traditional
loans. All respondents, regardless of prof-
itability group, indicated that losses on
their CRA loans were comparable to
losses on their conventional loans.
24
They further believed credit risk for their
CRA programs to be manageable; those
with comparatively profitable CRA pro-
grams were unanimous in that belief.
Approximately 72 percent (51) of those
with less profitable programs thought
credit risk on CRA lending was man-
ageable. Twenty-seven percent (19)
thought it was too soon to tell. Only one
Reliance on enhancements
Proportion of survey respondents, by profitability group, indicating reliance on govern-









Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number
As profitable 45 10 64 14 27 6
Less profitable 67 47 89 63 57 40
Table 3    




would have made 75 percent or
more of their CRA loans without
government guarantee programs
Respondents indicating they
would have made 75 percent or
more of their CRA loans without
community group assistance
Percent Number Percent Number
As profitable 81 17 90 20
Less profitable 75 51 75 50
Table 4 
24 The similarity in loss
rates found in our sur-
vey are consistent with
information gleaned




None of 11 institu-
tions that discussed
their loan loss experi-




CRA loans and their
conventional loans.
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22respondent thought these risks could
not be managed.
Unlike loss rates, delinquency rates dif-
fered between the two CRA profit groups.
Institutions with less profitable CRA
lending programs reported higher delin-
quency rates, perhaps reflecting their
more lenient underwriting standards on
CRA loans. The higher delinquency rates
may also help explain higher servicing
costs for these institutions. The informa-
tion presented in Figure 4 helps clarify
how more lenient credit standards and
higher delinquency rates may translate
into higher servicing costs.
Options for improving CRA lending
profits
In addition to asking respondents about
the relative profitability of their past CRA
lending efforts, we asked for their insights
concerning ways to improve future CRA
loan profits. Forty-three respondents
made suggestions on ways to improve
the profitability of CRA lending. Sugges-
tions invariably focused on ways to recoup
lost revenue and to reduce CRA loan
transactions costs. The most frequently
mentioned suggestions are summarized
in Table 5. Discussions concerning these
suggestions are grouped according to
their implications for revenues and costs.
Revenue enhancements
Survey responses indicated that institu-
tions with less profitable CRA programs
give up more fees and, as one respondent
put it, are “giving away the shop” at the
expense of profits. Less willingness to
“give away” (more rational competition)
and more public programs that assist
CRA borrowers with loan fees would less-
en subsidization by lenders and improve
their profitability from CRA lending.
Suggestions for removing regulatory
impediments were less specific. How-
ever, two respondents wanted to charge
higher rates for the added risk posed by
CRA loans and/or wanted to recover
costs associated with making these
loans. Both voiced concern that Depart-
ment of Justice interpretations of fair
lending laws and disparate treatment
could make this difficult. 
Expense reductions
The most common suggestion for improv-
ing CRA loan profitability was better
access to secondary markets. Presum-
ably some respondents would like to sell
more of their CRA loans to others at
higher prices, passing along the higher
monitoring costs (greater credit risk) and
lower interest rates. Since higher moni-
toring costs and below market rates lead
to discounts, higher prices are not pos-
sible without more competition from
charitable buyers investing for social
purposes. Thus, lender actions to improve
CRA loan profitability are confined to off-
setting higher servicing costs and raising
returns from these loans. 
Respondents offered a number of other
cost reducing suggestions. Three of the
most frequently mentioned were: more






Better/more flexible secondary markets 19 Costs
More transaction cost/buyer assistance 10 Revenues
More marketing assistance 6 Costs
More rational competition 5 Revenues
More buyer education 5 Costs
Less regulation 4 Revenues, Costs
Table 5





















Loan Monitoring Costs and Loan Losses1 
1In Figure 4, the two curved lines, labeled “Conventional loan delin-
quency” and “CRA loan delinquency," reflect possible trade-offs
between loan monitoring costs and loan losses. The CRA loan delin-
quency line is placed above the conventional loan deliquency line on
the assumption that higher delinquencies would result from more
lenient underwriting on CRA loans. M0 spent by an institution for
loan monitoring would lead to loan losses of L0 on its conventional
loans. However, because more leniently underwritten CRA loans
require greater loan monitoring, spending fixed amount M0 on CRA
loan monitoring would produce higher loan losses, L1, on these
loans. To keep CRA loan losses similar to those on conventional
loans, an institution would have to spend M1 on loan monitoring.
This may explain the results reported in the text of comparable
losses but higher delinquencies and servicing costs for some CRA
loan programs. 
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24marketing assistance, more buyer educa-
tion programs, and less regulation. The
first two suggestions rely heavily on part-
nering arrangements—primarily with
community groups and nonprofit organi-
zations—to lessen the costs of informing
potential borrowers of available loan
programs, pre-screening applicants
for financial responsibility, schooling
applicants on home ownership and
budgeting matters, and dealing with delin-
quencies.
25 These suggestions would
lower lender costs by shifting costs to
other groups.
Only six respondents answered the sur-
vey question on transaction cost savings
resulting from assistance provided by
partners. They estimated their CRA loan
transaction costs were lowered by approxi-
mately 19 percent because of assistance
received.
Less regulation was another cost saving
suggestion. One respondent advocated
less regulation, “specifically, appraisal
requirements which have added time
and cost without improving quality of
lower dollar home mortgage transac-
tions.” Other comments focused more
generally on reducing CRA regulation
but did not offer specific recommenda-
tions for achieving cost savings.
In summary, 43 respondents offered
suggestions on ways to improve the
profitability of CRA lending. These 
suggestions focused on reducing the
subsidy on CRA loans by recouping lost
revenues and reducing costs. Better and
more flexible secondary markets for
CRA loans, the most frequently sug-
gested method, is not likely to offset
higher servicing costs and interest
rate concessions made on these loans.
As a result, other suggestions such as
more transactions costs, buyer assis-
tance, marketing assistance, and buyer
education programs provided by govern-
ment and nonprofit organizations may
be better ways to improve CRA loan
profitability.
Summary and implications
In this study, we used a survey to explore
profitability differences between CRA
and conventional home mortgage lend-
ing programs at 97 large institutions.
The survey asked about factors affect-
ing the profitability of these programs—
revenues, costs, and losses—and asked
lenders to compare these factors for their
CRA mortgage loans with their conven-
tional mortgage loans.
The survey was not random and was not
intended to present a portrait of industry
practices. Only 2 percent of respondents
said their CRA lending was unprofitable.
Thus, 98 percent saw their CRA home
mortgage lending as making money, albeit
a majority concluded it was not as profit-
able as their conventional home mort-
gage lending.
In exploring profitability differences at
institutions, we found that lenders with
more profitable CRA loan programs were
more likely to treat their CRA lending as
they did their conventional lending. That
is, they gave up a smaller portion of their
fees, were less willing to cut their inter-
est rates on CRA loans, and kept their
origination and servicing costs near that
for conventional lending. 
Nearly all institutions, including those
with more profitable programs, loosened
their credit standards on CRA loans rela-
tive to standards on their conventional
loans. These institutions did so without
appreciable increases in loan losses. Fur-
ther, nearly all indicated that credit risk
on CRA loans is manageable. 
However, we found institutions with less
profitable CRA programs experienced
higher delinquencies on their CRA loans
than those with comparably profitable
programs. Since managing delinquencies
translates into higher transaction costs,
we suspect the higher transactions costs
reflect a riskier loan portfolio. This
higher risk may be an important factor
25 Lending consortia






increase when only a
handful of customers
qualify for any one
program.”  Consortia,








tomer bases could not
justify. It is an econo-
mies of scale issue.
However, as another
respondent noted,
this may not reduce




still have to fund that
group.”
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25in explaining lower CRA loan profitability
at some institutions.
Implications
The period covered in this study predates
the recent change in the regulation used
for CRA enforcement. In response to
both industry and community pressures
to quantify CRA performance measures,
the new performance-based regulation
will likely produce two results: give added
incentive to institutions to offer alter-
native lending products, including small
business loans, small farm loans and
consumer loans; and increase the overall
pressures on institutions to lend to lower-
income people and in lower-income
neighborhoods. 
With respect to alternative lending prod-
ucts, there is no reason to believe that
the risk, rate and transactions costs find-
ings in this study would not be applica-
ble to other loan products. Greater
pressure to lend, however, can have seri-
ous profit implications because there
are finite limits on “bankable loans” in
any community that can be made with-
out increasing credit risk and associated
transactions costs. Pressure to make
more loans may mean some lenders 
accept uncompensated credit risk. Such
pressures also increase incentives for
lenders to work in partnership with com-
munity organizations and government to
better manage risk and address commu-
nity credit needs. Our study findings
have implications for each of these part-
ners as well as for regulators.
For lenders, the key to success in CRA
lending appears to be lending that fol-
lows a “business as usual” approach,
incorporating CRA lending into the insti-
tution’s normal operations. In the case of
some lenders, this involves no special
departments, no special rates, limited
concessions on fees, and only modest
relaxation of credit and underwriting
standards. 
For community groups, a key to expand-
ing CRA lending appears to lie in helping
lenders reduce their transactions costs.
Pre- and post-purchase counseling pro-
grams that help reduce borrower delin-
quencies are ways to reduce these
costs. Assistance with delinquent bor-
rowers is another way to keep transac-
tions costs down. Help with marketing,
putting deals together, and absorbing
some of the paperwork costs with govern-
ment programs are additional avenues
for reducing lender costs.
For government, a key to increased pro-
gram use lies in devising borrower pro-
grams and regulatory policies that do
not add significantly to lender transac-
tions costs or lessen lender revenues.
Use of low documentation loan programs
that reduce paperwork burdens without
compromising credit standards is one
way to keep origination costs down on
CRA loans. Programs that help match
borrowers with available resources are
another way to keep a lid on CRA trans-
actions costs. 
Although regulators are not financial
resource partners in CRA lending, they
play an important role through their en-
forcement of the CRA and the fair lend-
ing laws. Here they influence two key
policy areas critical to CRA lending: (1)
defining what constitutes “satisfactory”
CRA performance vis a vis profitability
and the safety and soundness criteria for
lending, and (2) determining what is ac-
ceptable with respect to charging cus-
tomers for higher risk and/or higher
transactions costs. 
The first of these regulatory issues relates
to examiner assessments of the credit
quality of CRA loans. As with any non-
traditional lending effort, examiners
must assess risk in the context of the
institution’s capabilities to manage that
risk and absorb losses should they occur.
Their goal must not be to eliminate risk,
but rather to see that risk is properly 
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26managed. This approach gives banks lati-
tude to create new products, including
CRA loan products, and not have them
criticized simply because they differ from
more traditional products.
The second regulatory influence pertains
to fair lending law concerns that arise
from charging lower-income people, who
are also more likely to be protected class
individuals (e.g. minorities), higher rates
on loans. Higher charges to protected
class borrowers may be perceived by
lenders as well as regulators as violating
the nation’s fair lending laws, thus limit-
ing options for achieving profitability on
CRA loans. In this regard, policy state-
ments from regulators and the Justice
Department on these issues can help
resolve uncertainties about fair lending
law enforcement and clarify options for
achieving profitability on CRA loans.
If banks and others are to be major play-
ers in community reinvestment efforts
and lend to lower-income individuals
and neighborhoods beyond levels they per-
ceive required by CRA, they must achieve
competitive returns on their CRA lend-
ing. The findings in this study suggest
this can be done and offer guidance to
lenders and others on what can be done
to achieve more competitive returns.
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27There are many factors that can affect CRA lending profitability. These factors often are interre-
lated, making profitability analysis difficult. To strip away some of this complexity, we developed
four models to explore various aspects of CRA lending profitability. The first model evaluates fac-
tors that may influence the overall profitability of CRA lending. Subsequent models focus on
specific revenue and expense aspects of profitability and evaluate factors that may affect them.
CRA lending profitability
Ninety-seven institutions responded to the survey. All but three of these provided information on
the relative profitability of their CRA lending. Twenty-two institutions said their CRA lending was
as profitable or more profitable than their conventional lending. The remaining 72 said it was
less profitable.
1
To evaluate factors that may explain differences in relative profitability among institutions, we esti-
mated a logit model where the dependent variable was CRA loan profitability. This variable took the
value “1" if a surveyed institution reported its CRA lending was as profitable or more profitable
than its conventional lending; it took the value “0" otherwise.
The independent variables used to explain variations in CRA loan profitability, were:
2
Residential loans—this variable is the logarithm of the respondent’s 1994 residential loan origina-
tions. We included this variable as a proxy to capture institutional size effects. Since some sug-
gest that larger institutions with standardized monitoring systems may be at a disadvantage
relative to smaller institutions with more personalized systems, we hypothesized profitability
would be negatively related to size.
Institution type— this variable takes the value “1" if the respondent is a bank, the value “0" other-
wise. In our initial analysis of the survey, we noted that approximately 70 percent of those with
profitable CRA programs were banks. Those with less profitable programs were more evenly dis-
tributed among institution types—savings and loans, bank holding companies, mortgage bank-
ing companies, etc. Because of this, we thought CRA profitability might be positively related to
the survey respondent being a bank.
CRA program age—this variable represents the age in years of the CRA programs reported in our
survey. Ages were as of year-end 1994. We assumed older programs would be more profitable,
if for no other reason than the institutions offering them were well along the learning curve in
making these programs successful. 
FHA/VA—this variable is the percentage of the institution’s single family residential CRA loans that
were FHA or VA loans. These loans carry government guarantees and provide lenders with 
access to secondary mortgage markets. We thought guarantees and secondary market access
would have a positive effect on CRA loan profitability.
Appendix A: CRA lending profitability model
1 Only 94 institutions provided information on the profitability of their CRA programs.
2 In other formulations of the profit model, we included the proportion of 1994 CRA loans to 1994 residential loans
as a proxy for the importance of an institution’s CRA business. This variable was not significant in explaining
profit differences among CRA programs.
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28Economy—this variable takes the value “1" if the economy where a respondent operates is average
to strong, the value “0" if the economy is weak. We thought a strong economy would lessen
profitability differences between conventional and CRA loans by lowering delinquencies and
losses, especially on CRA loans.
The model was estimated using multi-variate logit
analysis.
3 The results from the estimation are
shown to the right. All coefficients have the expected
signs and two of the five variables are significant
at at least the 5 percent level or better. The Chi-
square statistic is significant at better than the 5
percent level, indicating the model has power in
explaining profitability differences among CRA
programs.
These results suggest that both institution size
and CRA program age are two important determi-
nants of CRA loan program profitability. Larger vol-
ume lenders tend to have less profitable CRA
programs and older CRA programs tend to be
more profitable.
To delve further into CRA loan profitability, we ana-
lyzed revenue and expense factors that we thought
could affect profitability.
Revenue factors
Responses to our survey, as well as surveys by others, indicate that some institutions may subsi-
dize CRA borrowers by “giving up” fees and charging below market interest rates on their CRA
loans. To test this proposition, we estimated a revenue equation for survey respondents. The
dependent variable in this ordinary least squares regression equation was the ratio of fees col-
lected on a typical single family CRA residential loan to fees collected on a similar size conventional
loan. The independent variables in the equation included the logarithm of residential loan origina-
tions and program age, variables previously used in the profitability model. 
In addition, we included the percent of CRA loans retained by an institution as an explanatory vari-
able. We consider this variable to be a proxy for the subsidy given to CRA borrowers. Higher CRA
loan retention rates may be indicative of subsidies given to borrowers that make these loans less
suitable for resale in secondary markets.
Appendix A: CRA lending profitability model (continued)
3 When the dependent variable is not continuous, ordinary least squares estimates of the regression coefficients
are not efficient, making logit analysis more appropriate. G.S. Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics, 2nd ed.,
(New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1992), p. 324.






CRA program age .0327
FHA/VA .0113
Economy .6111
1 Coefficients in bold type are significant at the 5 
percent level or below.  The Chi-square statistic for the
equation is 14.64, also significant at better than the 
5 percent level.
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29The regression results shown in the table below indicate that program age and percentage reten-
tion of CRA loans are significant factors in explaining relative fee differences among institutions.
From these results, it appears there is less fee dis-
counting as CRA programs age. One interpretation
of this result is that fee discounting occurs in the
early stages of programs as lenders attempt to
build an initial customer base; it could be a market-
ing effort to introduce a new product.
The results also show that greater fee discounting
is associated with higher CRA loan retention rates.
As hypothesized earlier, this may imply less suitabil-
ity of these loans for resale in secondary markets,
reflecting among other things greater subsidies,
such as below market interest rates, to borrowers. 
Expenses
Responses to our survey indicate that working with
borrowers, developing borrower information, paper-
work costs, grants to community groups, and
higher monitoring costs were factors contributing
to higher transactions costs on CRA loans. To analyze transactions cost differences, we broke the
lending process into two component parts—origination and servicing—and reviewed each.
Origination costs
The dependent variable in the origination cost model took the value “1" if survey respondents indi-
cated origination costs on their CRA loans were higher than on their conventional loans. It took the
value “0" otherwise. As before, we included the logarithm of residential loan originations and CRA
program age variables in the equation to control for institution size and program age. We also
included a CRA lending structure variable. This
variable took the value “1" if a respondent conducted
its CRA lending in a separate department, the value
“0" otherwise. We thought that conducting CRA
lending from a separate department might be associ-
ated with larger loan volumes, increased specializa-
tion, and greater familiarity with nuances of using
CRA programs and working with CRA borrowers.
These factors would tend to reduce origination costs
and have a positive effect on CRA loan profitability.
We used logit regression analysis to estimate the
origination cost equation. The results, shown in the
adjacent table, indicate that origination costs tend
to be higher at larger institutions. These higher costs
help explain the negative relationship between CRA
Appendix A: CRA lending profitability model (continued)






CRA program age .0060
% CRA loans retained -.0047
1 Coefficients in bold type are significant at the 5 
percent level or better. The F value for the equation is
3.82, which is significant at the 5 percent level or bet-
ter. The adjusted R2 for the equation is .16.
2 This variable was significant at the 12 percent level,
just below our 10 percent cutoff.




CRA program age -.0149
CRA lending structure 2.2328
1 Coefficients in bold type are significant at the 5 per-
cent level or better. The Chi-square statistic for the
equation is 19.03, also significant at better than the
5 percent level.
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30loan profitability and institution size. This result is also consistent with observations of others that
larger institutions, with their standardized lending systems, may be at a disadvantage in making
CRA loans relative to smaller institutions that are geared more toward individualized loan analysis.
Additionally, the results indicate that origination costs are higher for institutions where CRA lend-
ing is conducted as a separate activity. This relationship is opposite from what we expected, and
we have no definitive reason for this result. Perhaps it simply reflects that separate departments for
CRA lending are not cost effective due to lower loan volumes. It may also reflect better cost account-
ing data at institutions that conduct CRA lending in a separate department. Finally, as discussed
in the text, it may reflect a greater propensity to pay incentives to loan officers on CRA loans or to
lend to more marginal borrowers.
Servicing costs
The dependent variable in the servicing costs model took on a value of “1" if servicing costs on
a respondent’s CRA lending were higher than on its conventional lending and “0" otherwise.
The independent variables in the model included
the logarithm of residential loan originations and
the factors we held constant in the other models.
We included the delinquency rate on CRA loans as
an explanatory variable because we expected
higher delinquencies would require more borrower
contact and more intense loan monitoring, raising
servicing costs. 
The results, shown in the adjacent table, suggest
that institution size and CRA program age are not
significant factors in explaining differences in CRA
servicing costs for survey respondents. The CRA
delinquency rate, however, is significant. Higher
CRA loan delinquencies are associated with
higher servicing costs.
In summary, analysis of CRA loan profitability can be exceedingly complex because of the interac-
tion among the many factors that can influence profit. The models presented here attempt to hold
some factors constant in order to judge the effects of others. In this regard, we found loan origina-
tion volume (our proxy for size) and CRA program age are important CRA loan profitability factors.
We found smaller institutions with fewer originations tended to report higher CRA loan profitability
and older CRA programs tended to be more profitable than newer programs.
Holding these factors constant, we did a more detailed analysis of revenue and expenses associated
with CRA lending relative to conventional lending. After doing so, we found that more profitable
CRA programs tended to subsidized borrowers less, were not generally conducted as a separate
activity of the institution, and usually had lower loan delinquency rates.
Appendix A: CRA lending profitability model (continued)




CRA program age .0077
CRA loan delinquency rate .5347
1 Coefficients in bold type are significant at the 5 per-
cent level or better. The Chi-square statistic for the
equation is 23.11, also significant at better than the 
5 percent level.
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31The accompanying table presents major features of CRA programs described by survey respon-
dents. Some of these programs were initiated by the respondents and others were made available
through or in conjunction with state agencies and private institutions. In addition to these pro-
grams, a number of respondents noted they used Rural Development, Federal Housing Administra-
tion, and Veterans Administration programs. They also used Fannie Mae’s (Federal National
Mortgage Association’s (FNMA)) Community Homebuyer’s program.
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15 Many closing costs 
waived, average 
saving of $750 to 
borrower





17 Lower fees Lower rate
18 $300 flat fee,
no points, no
reserves
3% 33% 41% No PMI
19 5%
(3/2 option)
20 3% 33% 38%
21 3-5% FNMA
loans
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27 5% No PMI



























1The front ratio is the ratio of principle, interest, taxes and insurance payments to borrower income. A front ratio of 26 percent is often used as
a guide for conventional loans.
2The back ratio adds other debt payments to the computation of the front ratio. A back ratio of 36 percent is often used as a guide for conven-
tional loans.
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34If underwriting standards on single family residential CRA loans differ from those for traditional
loans, how do they differ?
Profit group Percent higher/more Percent same Percent lower Total responses
Debt to income ratio
As profitable 69 31 0 16
Less profitable 84 14 2 64
Loan to value ratio
As profitable 73 27 0 15
Less profitable 75 20 5 65
Reliance on collateral
As profitable 0 100 0 16
Less profitable 9 72 19 65
Reliance on character
As profitable 6 88 6 16
Less profitable 17 70 13 64
Reliance on borrower credit history
As profitable 6 53 41 17
Less profitable 8 41 51 64
Appendix C: Underwriting criteria by profitability group
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